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APPLICATION OF COMMUNICATION GROUNDING FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS
EFFECTIVENESS OF HUMAN-AUTOMATION INTERFACE DESIGN: A TCAS CASE STUDY
Doug Glussich, Jonathan M. Histon, Stacey D. Scott
Systems Design Engineering
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, ON Canada
The role of the human operator in automation augmented domains has shifted from primary
decision-maker to collaborative partner, where the human often has to understand and manage
state changes that result from the automation itself. Due to the challenges of these progressively
complex states, there is increasing demand for automation systems that provide effective humanautomation interfaces that keep the human more “in-the-loop”. Effective human-automation
interaction in this situation is akin to effective human-human communication: an effective
conversation occurs when people use commonly understood verbal and non-verbal mechanisms
that lead to shared understanding, or common ground. In this paper, we demonstrate how the
application of a communication grounding framework, typically used to describe the practices of
effective human communication, can be used as an analytic tool to assess human-automation
interfaces. This analytic tool can be used to highlight design flaws likely to result in breakdowns
in human-automation interaction, and ultimately lead to human error.
Aviation has been a strong domain for the advancement of automation. In the century since first flight in
North Carolina, aviation has helped advance technologies in the domains of metallurgy, electronics, navigation and
engine design. From the early days of the diminutive Wright Flyer, to the Airbus A380, aviation has been largely a
successful collaboration of man with technology. However, the introduction of more, and increasingly sophisticated,
automation into aircraft systems has not always gone as smoothly, or safely as intended. As aircraft designs have
advanced, and begun to incorporate more complex automation systems, the pilot’s role has shifted from one of
manual controller of the aircraft systems to a higher-level role of managing the various automation systems now
controlling the aircraft systems, and if necessary, intervene in flight operations to respond to abnormal situations.
Pilots of modern aircraft must work collaboratively with the onboard automation systems to maintain
efficient performance and safe operations. Unfortunately, this human-automation collaboration is not always
successful. Several accidents investigated by aviation safety bodies have been attributed to ineffective humanautomation interaction (AAIASB 1987). In many cases, the aircrew was unable to understand the message the
automation was communicating. They failed to recognize the overall situation and instead dealt with a secondary
condition of attempting to ascertain what the automation was trying to convey; a condition known as operator “OutOf-The-Loop” (OOTL) syndrome (Endsley 1995). An example of this situation was the case of the fatal crash of
Helios Airways flight 522 in August 2005.
Helios Airways 522 was a Boeing 737-400 on a charter flight from the island of Crete to Prague, Czech
Republic. During the initial climb, the aircraft failed to pressurize due to a pressurization switch that had been left
in the incorrect position. Subsequently, a warning horn had sounded identifying the condition. The crew failed to
recognize the horn as dealing with a pressurization problem and misidentified the condition. The pilots, unaware of
the now hypoxic environment, lost consciousness. The aircraft later crashed outside of Athens at the cost of 121
lives. The crash was attributed, at least in part, to the aircrew’s failure to successfully identify and interpret the
aircraft warning systems activation (AAIASB 1987).
A challenge for automation designers is to ensure that their systems can effectively communicate warnings
and alerts to pilots so that appropriate actions can be taken. In many automation systems, however, it is assumed
that simply conveying the warning or alert message is sufficient for effective communication to occur, and for the
problem to be resolved. For example, the crew alerting system (CAS) mentioned in the above example is designed
to alert the pilot of abnormal conditions based on various aircraft parameters; however, it does not have the capacity
to monitor the reaction of the pilots to any warning it conveys. Anyone who has ever sent directives via an email or
written memo knows that simply conveying a message to someone does not necessarily guarantee that the recipient
will understand the message and take appropriate action – even highly trained pilots. Messages can often be
interpreted in multiple ways, depending on the context, and, thus, misunderstandings can occur. Experiences in

human-human communication show that successful communication typically requires much more interaction
between parties, through an interactive back-and-forth process to establish that a message is understood (Clark and
Brennan, 1991).
The inherent limitations of the one-way only communication model used in the CAS system has been
recognized by automation designers, and more sophisticated alerting systems have begun to appear that incorporate
improved communication processes that promote better human-automation collaboration. However, few analytic
tools currently exist to assist designers in assessing how well their system designs promote effective humanautomation interaction. Design limitations are often only discovered after expensive field testing has occurred or
during accident investigations. Recognizing the parallels between human-human communication and humanautomation interaction can open new possibilities for analytic tools, as one recognizes that decades of research has
been dedicated to analyzing human communication processes and understanding how these processes can promote
effective communication.
A particularly relevant communication analysis tool is Clark and Brennan’s (1991) communication
grounding framework, as it describes the process by which people reach a mutual understanding or, common
ground, when communicating. Such “grounding” is also critical in the aviation context, as pilots must clearly
understand the message conveyed by an automation system in order to implement an appropriate response action.
Grounding mechanisms identified by Clark and Brennan’s framework help communicating parties identify when
misunderstandings have occurred, and help repair those misunderstandings. In the aviation context, it is important,
for instance, that an automation system recognize when a pilot has misunderstood an alert and responded
inappropriately, so that communication repairs can be made. In this paper, we show how the communication
grounding framework can be used as an analysis tool to assess the effectiveness of the human-automation interaction
processes enabled by the features of an automation system. We demonstrate this analysis method through a case
study of a current aviation automation system, the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).
To set the context for the case study, we first describe the TCAS automation system and then overview the
communication grounding framework. Finally, we present the case study which analyzes the evolution of the TCAS
design, and identifies how the design iterations introduced improved grounding mechanisms between the pilot and
the automation system.
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
TCAS is an example of a device that warns pilots to the possible threat of collision with another aircraft.
The system is a display situated in the flightdeck that is either a stand-alone device or one that is integrated with the
navigation display. The display is comprised of an overview of the host aircraft as well as distance and relative
altitudes of close proximity threat aircraft. If an aircraft enters a predefined range, the threat level of the aircraft is
identified and registered on the display. In the application of TCAS to an impending collision scenario, time critical
functions must be met with a response equal to the criticality of the scenario. This is accomplished by the use of
aural and visual cues to increase the flightcrew’s awareness of the possible threat situation. In TCAS, levels of
communication between automation and humans are divided into two classifications; either an information level or
an immediate action response. The first state, known as a traffic advisory, deals with the possibility of an aircraft
becoming a threat due to its close approximation to the host aircraft. As the threat aircraft approaches the subject
aircraft, their indication on the host aircraft display will turn color from white to amber and an aural “traffic, traffic”
alert will sound. The purpose of this message is to inform the pilots of potential threat traffic in close proximity to
the host aircraft. If the threat aircraft continues to approach the threat aircraft, the system will provide an immediate
action command, for example, a “Climb, Climb Now” (known as a resolution advisory), in case the pilots must
execute in a expeditious manner.
The TCAS system is an example of an automation system that actively communicates to the pilot (human
operator) across a two-way channel. The system recognizes actions undertaken by pilots at the direction of the
resolution advocated by the particular warning system.
These warning systems were designed through an examination of the weaknesses of pilot response to
environmental threats. In the time preceding TCAS, aircraft threat recognition and avoidance was primarily done
through aural communication between pilots and ground controllers transmitting threat location relative to the

respondent aircraft, or between the pilots themselves via aural and non verbal gesturing (e.g., pointing to a certain
location relative to their aircraft). After a long history of midair collisions, the United States Congress enacted
legislation following the crash of Aeromexico flight 498 in August 1986 (NTSB, 2007) mandating that transport
aircraft would require automated collision avoidance systems. In essence, the intent of the TCAS automation
system is to augment both the communications between air traffic control and pilots and between the flightcrew
themselves with another aid in collision detection and avoidance.
Initial TCAS technology provided for very few states. The original system (TCAS I) informed the pilots of
a potential threat (the aural “traffic” call with accompanying visual display) and a “Clear of Conflict” aural
presentation. The original TCAS system did not have the capacity to understand if the message was interpreted
correctly by the pilots and had no provision to update or revise the message if the pilots failed to understand the
original message. TCAS I provided the same type of one-way communication model as the original CAS
technology, and failed to advance the need for confirmation of understanding of the intended message. The case
study will discuss this design limitation in more detail and how the revised TCAS II system addressed this design
issue.
Clark and Brennan’s Communication Grounding Framework
Clark and Brennan’s (1991) theory of communication grounding is one of the most fundamental and
influential theories and frameworks to arise from the human communication literature. It has been widely used by
communication and collaboration researchers to understand human communication behavior (e.g., Stahl, 2006), as
well as an analytic tool to assess the ability of collaboration technologies to support successful communication (e.g.,
Vandergriff, 2006, Beers et al., 2007). Clark and Brennan’s work has primarily been applied to the exchange of
information between humans; however, researchers have previously utilized it to examine interaction between
autonomous systems. Billard and Dautenhahn (1998) examined the use of common ground in the education of
autonomous robots; specifically to examine information exchange between student and teacher robots.
The fundamental concept underlying the communication grounding framework is that effective
communication relies on people’s ability to reach a mutual understanding, or common ground, of the messages
being conveyed to one another during a conversation. Reach this common ground, often referred to as “being on the
same page”, is accomplished through a process called grounding (Clark and Brennan, 1991). A core component of
the grounding process is that conversation proceeds in a series of presentation and acceptance phases (Figure 1),
during which the conversing parties attempt to achieve a mutual understanding of the message conveyed (or
presented) before moving onto the next presentation and acceptance conversational segment.

Presentation phase:
Acceptance phase:

A presents a message to B
B accepts the message by giving evidence that he/she believes what A means by that
message.
Figure 1. Conversational segment (Clark and Brennan, 1991)

The grounding process begins, and is a key aspect of, the acceptance phase. The message receiver, B in
Figure 1, attempts to determine whether she understands the message that the presenter, A in Figure 1, has
conveyed. If B believes she does not understand the message she will provide negative evidence of grounding by
requesting clarification from A, or providing a similar response. If B believes she understands the message, but in
fact does not, A will monitor B’s response during the acceptance phase (and, in fact, throughout the rest of the
conversation) for any evidence of a misunderstanding. If such evidence presents itself, then A will attempt to repair
the miscommunication in order to complete the acceptance phase.
The communication grounding framework describes several forms of evidence people use to assess
whether grounding has been achieved. The most common, and most relevant for our purposes include:



Lack of negative evidence, i.e., evidence one was misheard or misunderstood
Relevant next turn, e.g., receiving an appropriate answer to a question

In the human-automation communication context, an example of a relevant next turn would be for a pilot to
implement an appropriate action in response to an automation alert, and thereby providing positive evidence to the
automation system (if it is capable of monitoring the pilot’s actions) that the alert was understood correctly. If
instead, the pilot took no action when needed or an incorrect action this would provide negative evidence of
grounding, which the automation system could then identify and respond to in order to clarify the original message
(and complete the acceptance phase of grounding).
Measuring the degree of successful automation, from the communication grounding framework
perspective, in human-automation interactions should answer the following questions: Is the message clearly
conveyed? Has the message been understood and accepted by the receiver. If not, does the receiver have the ability
to tell the original sender if the message is not understood? Does the original sender have the capacity to revise that
original message in order to repair the misunderstanding?
Another fundamental concept of communication grounding is the principle of least collaborative effort: “In
conversation, the participants try to minimize their collaborative effort – the work that both have to do from the
initiation of each contribution to its mutual acceptance.” (Clark and Brennan, 1991). This principle dictates that
people will work together to minimize the overall effort expended during a conversation. On one hand this means
that participants will attempt to minimize their own personal effort in transmitting and receiving information. On
the other hand, it also establishes a social contract between parties to help each other efficiently reach a mutual
understanding. In essence, this means that the “receiver” of the information will not make the “sender” do all the
work to convey a clear and precise message. The receive will help the sender by identifying misunderstandings, and
perhaps even suggesting alternative messages for the sender to consider to repair misunderstandings should they
occur. This is a highly interactive process, but allows people to communicate very efficiently overall.
In the aviation context, brief alert messages are typically preferred, for example, the aural warning message
“traffic”, is typically used over a more elaborate, but unnecessary, “another aircraft in close proximity to you”.
Likewise, instead of requiring a pilot to acknowledge the “traffic” alert via input into the system before taking
action, simply responding with the appropriate action will provide positive evidence of understanding and minimizes
overall communication effort between the human and the automation.
The presentation and acceptance phases of a conversation have their own associated challenges unique to
the medium in which they are taking place. For example, a face-to-face conversation requires less mental taxation
than that of a text conversation from distant participants. These challenges, or constraints, are one of the dimensions
that affect grounding. They are the basis by which parties increase overall performance through different
environmental conditions. If augmentation of these dimensions can be achieved, the reduction of collaborative
effort would be the overall outcome. These constraints include, but are not restricted to (Clark and Brennan, 1991):




Visibility, an environment in which A and B are visible to each other.
Audibility, an environment in which A and B can hear each other.
Reviewability, an environment / media in which B can review A’s messages.

Costs, on the other hand, provide alternative measures to address weaknesses in constraints. The penalty
for these costs can retard the effective communication between communication participants. Communication costs
include, but are not restricted to (Clark and Brennan, 1991):




Reception costs are associated with receiving a message. Listening is generally easier (lower cost)
than reading.
Understanding costs are associated with understanding a message. The more complex the message or
words used to convey the message, the higher the understanding cost.
Start-Up costs are associated with initiating a communication. When co-present, start-up costs tend to
be low, except if the environment is chaotic, and then getting the receiver’s attention may be costly.

Automation designers must be aware of the potential constraints and costs associated with their system
design and with the environment in which the system will be deployed. Each of these factors can influence the
ability of the system to support effective grounding during human-automation interaction.

Case Study
The introduction of the initial TCAS I traffic warning system provided a significant advancement in
collision avoidance, certainly above the historical “look out the window” approach. Analyzing the TCAS I design
using the communication grounding framework, however, reveals limitations in its ability to support effective
communication between the automation and the flightcrew. When a threat aircraft is recognized, the TCAS I system
communicates this threat by presenting the relevant information to the flightcrew in both aural and visual formats; in
this case an amber target is displayed on the TCAS display and an aural “Traffic, Traffic” message is provided. This
is the “presentation phase” of the communication between the automation and the pilot. In human-human
communication, this phase would then be followed by an “acceptance phase”, during which the message receiver
would demonstrate to the message conveyer that they have understood the message and the conveyer would monitor
the receiver’s behavior for evidence of understanding. The TCAS I system enables only a limited type of acceptance
phase; it only monitors for positive grounding evidence, indicated by the pilots implementing the appropriate
maneuver away from the threat aircraft. Once a positive outcome is detected, the TCAS I system would issue the
aural message “Clear of Conflict”. While this represents one type of “presentation” and “acceptance” phase, the
grounding framework demonstrates that other grounding mechanisms are often necessary to facility successful
communication after an initial message is presented.
From a grounding perspective, the main limitation of TCAS I is that it cannot detect miscommunications,
and consequently, cannot attempt to repair those miscommunications. There is no provision in the system to monitor
the flightcrew’s actions for negative evidence of grounding (e.g., no action or an incorrect action taken). Thus,
TCAS I has no means to repair a miscommunication, through, for example a revised cautionary command that might
facilitate a relevant next turn by a flightcrew who has misinterpreted the significance of the initial presentation.
The revised TCAS II system addresses some of these issues by providing more sophisticated
communication possibilities between the automation and the flightcrew after the initial presentation of the traffic
advisory warning message (“Traffic, Traffic”). Once the initial warning is issued, TCAS II monitors the flightcrew’s
actions for evidence of grounding. In particular, it can recognize whether actions have been taken to maneuver the
aircraft away from the threat, and whether these actions will be sufficient. If not, TCAS II can revise the initial
message with the resolution advisory, or RA (“Climb, Climb Now”), in order to repair the miscommunication. The
manner in which this message is conveyed also facilitates grounding. The brief aural command minimizes reception
costs (listening to a warning is easier than reading a display) and understanding costs (the short climb command is
easier and less time restrictive than detailing the action for the aircraft to increase altitude). Also, the ‘climb’
directive is also visualized on the TCAS display, providing reviewability, which further reduces understanding costs
(visibility and audibility versus audibility alone). If the TCAS II system determines that the rate of climb or descent
is insufficient after issuing an RA to the flightcrew, an aural “Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust” will be broadcast. As
with TCAS I, the communication loop is closed with the “Clear of Conflict” acceptance message.
Overall, the revised TCAS II design provides a much more interactive communication process between the
automation system and the flightcrew, more closely aligned with human-human communication, primarily through
expanded monitoring and communication repair capabilities in the automation design. Miscommunications are
recognized and repaired to achieve a positive overall outcome.
In summary, TCAS II expands on the initial presentation / acceptance framework in TCAS I by introducing
the ability of TCAS II to revise miscommunications. TCAS II provides for the automation to look for positive and
negative evidence of grounding from the flightcrew that the initial presentation has been accepted and understood.
Challenges Looking Forward
Although the design revisions introduced in the TCAS II system provided expanded communication
potential for human-automation interaction, its grounding capabilities could be improved. A recent traffic safety
study by Eurocontrol (2010) identified key shortcomings in the TCAS II system. The most prominent failings
identified in the study related to the system’s inability of revise a resolution advisory in order to resolve a potential
collision. From a grounding perspective, this indicates the system’s inability to recognize a wider variety of negative
evidence from the flightcrew’s actions.

In the case of the traffic advisory, negative evidence occurs when no actions are taken in response to the
initial presentation of the warning. In the TCAS I system, there was no ability to repair this miscommunication.
TCAS II addressed this challenge with the RA (“Climb, Climb Now”) command. The new challenge occurs while
the aircraft is following an RA. When in RA mode, repairs must address not only the performance of the host
aircraft (whether or not to climb or descent) but also the degree of execution. Although this is evident with the
“Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust”, the repair message is not explicit enough as to whether the adjustment should be
more or less aggressive, potentially introducing more misunderstanding. The performance profile is currently only
included on the TCAS display. A message that more explicitly indicates these factors would facilitate the grounding
process. The result would be a decrease in the understanding costs and a net positive performance.
The Eurocontrol study also identified the need for an RA reversal (e.g., from climb to descent) if the
actions of the threat aircraft contravene its own TCAS system. This capability would require further design changes
to the TCAS system to enable the presentation of a new, alternative message to the flightcrew, and further
monitoring of the crew’s understanding of this new message.
Conclusion
The effort to formulate messages in human-human conversations shared a close association with humanautomation interaction. In this paper we examined how theories that were once identified as constituting the minutia
of human-human conversations can be applied to human-automation communication. By examining the
communication grounding framework, we identified this as an analytic tool to help designers assess the
effectiveness of their automation system for promoting effective human-automation communication. The presented
case study on the TCAS automation system highlights and explains crucial design improvements that contribute to
improved human-automation communication in the current TCAS II system. The communication ground framework
also helped identify design deficiencies that were addressed in proposed TCAS display improvements.
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